State v. Dixson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

CARL DAVIS DIXSON, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 24-0365 PRPC
FILED 08-05-2025

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2018-001973-001
The Honorable Dewain D. Fox, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

APPEARANCES

Carl Davis Dixson, Florence
Petitioner

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Faith C. Klepper
Counsel for Respondent
 STATE v. DIXSON
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Carl Dixson petitions for review of the superior court’s order
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), filed under
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32.1. We grant review but
deny relief.

¶2 In March 2021, a jury convicted Dixson of two counts of
sexual conduct with a minor (Counts 1 and 7), three counts of molestation
of a child (Counts 2, 8, and 9), indecent exposure (Count 3), and three counts
of aggravated assault on a minor (Counts 4, 5, and 6). The superior court
sentenced Dixson to the following consecutive prison terms on each count:
life with the possibility of release after 35 years on Count 1; 17-year
sentences for Counts 2, 8, and 9; and one-year sentences for Counts 3, 4, 5,
and 6. This court affirmed Dixson’s convictions and sentences on direct
appeal. State v. Dixson, 1 CA-CR 21-0203, 2022 WL 1043748, at *1, ¶ 2.

¶3 After Dixson filed a PCR notice under Rule 32.1, his PCR
counsel filed a notice indicating counsel was unable to find any colorable
claims for relief. Dixson then filed a pro se PCR petition, asserting he was
denied a fair trial because the prosecutor “used improper methods
calculated to produce” wrongful convictions and thus committed
prosecutorial misconduct. In response, the State argued in part that
Dixson’s prosecutorial claim was precluded because it was not raised on
appeal. In his reply, Dixson asserted he was unable to access legal materials
to identify what issues he could raise until long after this court’s briefing
deadline due to a closure of the prison’s law library.

¶4 The superior court dismissed Dixson’s petition, finding
Dixson’s sole claim raised—prosecutorial misconduct—was precluded
because it “could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal.” The
court explained that Dixson was aware of the factual basis for his
prosecutorial misconduct claim but failed to file a pro per supplemental
appellate brief, and that Dixson’s appellate counsel presumably did not
raise the claim on appeal because it was not meritorious. The court rejected

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Decision of the Court

Dixson’s claim that he lacked the legal resources to raise the prosecutorial
misconduct claim on appeal, noting that the documentation he provided
with his reply showed that “although the library was not open for
‘browsing,’ the library’s books were available for checkout.” The court also
found that even if Dixson lacked access to legal resources, “he was aware
of the alleged factual basis for his prosecutorial misconduct claim” and
could have presented such facts in his pro se supplemental briefing.

¶5 The court further concluded that even if Dixson’s
prosecutorial misconduct claim was not precluded, it was not colorable
because he failed to show “any act of prosecutorial misconduct--let alone
that the alleged misconduct ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Dixson then petitioned
this court for review. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4239(C) and
Rule 32.16.

¶6 We review the superior court’s decision on a PCR petition for
an abuse of discretion and will affirm if the decision “is legally correct for
any reason.” State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508, ¶ 7 (2015). “An abuse of
discretion occurs if the PCR court makes an error of law or fails to
adequately investigate the facts necessary to support its decision.” State v.
Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180, ¶ 4 (2017). Dixson has the burden to show the
court abused its discretion. State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 538, ¶ 1 (App.
2011).

¶7 A defendant is precluded from relief when a claim was
“waived at trial or on appeal, or in any previous post-conviction
proceeding, except when the claim raises a violation of a constitutional right
that can only be waived knowingly, voluntarily, and personally by the
defendant.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). “To prevent endless or nearly
endless reviews of the same case in the same trial court, Rule 32.2(a)
precludes collateral relief on a ground that either was or could have been
raised on direct appeal or in a previous PCR proceeding.” State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, ¶ 12 (2009).

¶8 Dixson argues the court’s dismissal of his petition was
inappropriate because the State failed to provide him with legal resources,
which constitutes government interference. He asserts the prison facility’s
COVID-19 protocols restricted him from: (1) receiving assistance from more
legally knowledgeable prisoners, (2) meeting with a paralegal face-to-face,
and (3) browsing the prison’s library in person. The first two assertions
were not raised in the superior court and are therefore waived. See State v.
Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468 (App. 1980) (precluding defendant from raising

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Decision of the Court

PCR issues for the first time on review). Regardless, Dixson provided no
supporting evidence that all library resources were unavailable to him.
Instead, the document Dixson provided with his reply confirmed the
library would be open for “book browsing” “in addition to the current way
the library [was] being operated.” The document also stated that ”[i]f you
wish to check out books[,] you may still utilize the book catalogs and submit
a book request as you have been.” Moreover, Dixson’s PCR petition does
not address the superior court’s finding that, at a minimum, he could have
asserted the “alleged factual basis” for his prosecutorial misconduct claim
in a pro per supplemental brief.

¶9 Because “reasonable access to the courts is satisfied by access
to court[-]appointed counsel or adequate law libraries,” Dixson has not
shown the superior court erred. See Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346
(1992); see also Knight v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 551, 554 (App. 1989) (“The
effect of access to an appointed advisory counsel normally overcomes any
research handicap that restrictions on access to a jail library impose on an
inmate.”); Salstrom v. State, 148 Ariz. 382, 385 (App. 1986) (“If . . . the
prisoner has access to a court-appointed attorney, he has sufficient access
to legal research materials.”). Dixson had access to court-appointed counsel
in identifying potential issues for appeal, and according to the
documentation he provided to the superior court, he also had access to legal
materials by using the book catalogs and check-out option available to
inmates. Thus, the court appropriately concluded that Dixson’s
prosecutorial misconduct claim could have been, but was not, raised on
direct appeal through counsel, or in Dixson’s pro per supplemental
appellate brief. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Dixson’s PCR petition, we grant review but deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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